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It was Cicero, writing in the 1st-century BCE, who deemed Herodotus the patrem
historiae, the “father of history”—a paternity so absolute that we barely bother to attribute the
phrase. But this decontextualization is misleading; in the same sentence that Cicero calls
Herodotus the “father of history,” he also calls him a liar, a fabulosus. Elsewhere, too, Cicero
takes aim at Herodotus, claiming that certain details of his Histories were fabricated, such as the
famously ambiguous Delphic prophecy given to Croesus, which stated that if Croesus went to
war against Persia he would destroy a great empire—his own. And such critique was by no
means confined to Cicero; even before the first century BCE, Herodotus was already an almost
too-easy target. That Cicero, in one unbroken sentence, could call Herodotus both the “father of
history” and an outright liar seems strange—just as it seems to justify our selective reading of
Cicero’s original—but this contradiction is vital to understanding Herodotus’ legacy.
Many of Herodotus’ posthumous critics were openly skeptical that he could know for
certain the details of battles fought long before his birth, or understand the cultures whose
languages he never learned. His critics saw him as cautious, but uncritical; serious, but
imaginative; and, on the whole, strangely inconsistent in his ability to discern myth from fact.
The classicist, Alfred Croiset, writes, “he does not believe that doves ever speak; yet he does not
think it incredible that a mare should give birth to a rabbit” (Croiset 212). Even among other
historians, who as a group were routinely accused of dishonesty, Herodotus was a favorite target.
But even this backlash, which might end a modern historian’s career overnight, wasn’t enough to
strike out Herodotus from the then young historiographical canon. That Cicero, in one unbroken
sentence, could call Herodotus both the “father of history” and an outright liar seems strange—
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just as it seems to justify our selective reading of Cicero’s original—but this contradiction is vital
to understanding Herodotus’ legacy. It was clear to the ancient critics and readers of the Histories
that there was, as Arnaldo Momigliano puts it, “no Herodotus before Herodotus” (Momigliano
2). But it was also clear that mares can’t give birth to rabbits. So by the time Cicero deemed
Herodotus the “father of history,” it was meant only in the sense of his influence, rather than his
value as a historian. More than anything, Cicero’s criticism seems to suggest just how much the
form developed in the three centuries after Herodotus’ death.
Although the idea of vetting a recorded past wasn’t entirely foreign to the ancient Greeks,
it was by no means an obligatory or common practice. The earliest recognizable histories have
been credited to a group of writers the Greeks called the logographoi—who, as their title
suggests, were the writers (grapho) of stories or prose (logos). But it might be more accurate to
call them collectors, as their writings were confined to chronicling the oral traditions and origin
stories surrounding certain peoples and towns. And although the logographers were among the
first to break from the Homeric tradition, there was little difference between them and the early
poets other than they wrote in prose; whether they wrote myths or merely recorded them, both
were equally willing to figure the supernatural and dramatic into their writings. When Strabo
read the chronicles of the logographoi in the 1st-century BCE, it was already clear they were a
far cry from serious histories (Croiset 197). But whether the logographoi have more in common
with Homer or Tacitus seems like the wrong question to ask: the logographoi were the inevitable
writerly manifestation of a new era of historical consciousness, beginning in fits and starts
around the Greek world during the 6th-century BCE, which saw the first systematic attempts at
deliberately archiving and recording the world, both past and present. From a modern,
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sympathetic point of view, the logographoi then seem less like bad historians than overeager
collectors, not yet sure what they’re supposed to be looking for.
The first to bring some order to the mess of these proto-histories was Hecataeus of
Miletus. In his work, Genealogia (c. 490 BCE), he sets out his task: “I write what I consider the
truth, for the things Greeks tell us are in my opinion full of contradictions and worthy to be
laughed out of court.” Among the logographoi, Hecataeus’ skepticism of oral histories and
traditions was singular. He felt that his work was not merely the work of an amanuensis, but the
work of a craftsman; and the stories he gathered during his extensive travels served as the raw
materials with which he fashioned what he considered more accurate accounts of the past. It
might seem strange then that Hecataeus failed to apply a similar skepticism to the works of
Homer and other early poets, and, like the other logographoi, often leaned on their verses
ignored to justify his historical claims. But what we perceive to be lapses of judgment or
historical seriousness are really just the growing pains of a completely novel form of writing.
As historical writing gained mass and, through so many generations of writers,
differentiated itself from its predecessors, it became increasingly clear what was and what wasn’t
viable evidence. There was a precedent, an body of guidelines and rules with which historians
could evaluate their materials and claims. So even though Hecataeus was the first to make a
critical point of separating myth from fact, it wasn’t yet clear at that time where one ended and
the other began. And whereas Hecataeus might dismiss an account of the past on the grounds that
it contradicted a more reliable version, he felt that works as monolithic and culturally embedded
as The Odyssey and The Iliad occupied a space beyond his critical reach: they had become
authorities in their own right; and to challenge their veracity would have seemed less a labor of
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truth than an unprovoked attack on Greek identity itself. Although it’s difficult to exaggerate the
importance and ingenuity of Hecataeus' critical method to the development of the historical
form, the fact that he was more concerned with reconciling rather than separating myth from fact
means that his Genealogia only managed to step halfway out of the shadow of Homeric tradition.
With the few fragments of the Genealogia that remain, it’s hard to prove with certainty
the degree to which Hecataeus influenced Herodotus’ Histories. And while their systematic,
skeptical approach to evidence is undoubtedly the common denominator, Herodotus’ numerous,
often derisive allusions to the Genealogia and the logographoi in his own work suggest a
cooperative, if contentious relationship to his predecessors. In fact, it seems more likely that it
was Herodotus’ dissatisfaction with the Genealogia and its poetic evidence, rather than the
novelty of its skepticism, that inspired him to so radically depart from the historiographical
tradition. Writing nearly four hundred years after the death of Herodotus, Dionysius of
Halikarnassos summarized the departure: unlike the logographoi, he writes, Herodotus “chose
not to write down the history of a single city or nation, but to put together many” in order to
consolidate the “events of Europe and Asia in a single comprehensive work” (Dionysius 5).
Rather than centering on a particular city, Herodotus expanded the scope and ambition of
history to include the known world. Where the logographoi painted portraits, Herodotus painted
landscapes. In the Histories, he relates the major events of the Greek world and Persian empire
during the two centuries before his own life, achieving what was then the first general, widefocused view of history. And to this day his writings remain the primary and often only source of
documentation for that the period. But most importantly, in Herodotus we also find the first truly
modern use of the word “history” (ἱστορία). In the opening lines, Herodotus writes,
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These are the researches (ἱστορία) of Herodotus of Halicarnassus, which he publishes, in the
hope of thereby preserving from decay the remembrance of what men have done, and of
preventing the great and wonderful actions of the Greeks and the Barbarians from losing their
due meed of glory; and withal to put on record what were their grounds of feuds. (A. D.
Godley. trans).
Taken literally, ἱστορία is closely linked to the English word “inquiry”—especially one applied to
a scientific or systematic observation of empirical evidence. In the writings of Herodotus and his
contemporaries, ἱστορία typically denotes the research or process of questioning behind a work,
rather than the work itself; but here, and here only, we see that Herodotus’ employment of
ἱστορία is meant to mean something like the sum or result of his inquiries.
Like Herodotus, Plutarch stands at the head of a long and complex tradition of writings:
biography. In his magnum opus, Parallel Lives, he also takes up the endeavor of writing the
distant past—but instead of collecting and recording the movements of people and armies to
fashion something like the Histories, Plutarch takes up the specific stories and legends
surrounding particular people. His approach is largely formulaic, and he divides his portraits into
complementary pairs: one remarkable Greek, one remarkable Roman. Typically, Plutarch begins
with the subject’s birth, offers a series of vital events and anecdotes, and then ends with death.
But different subjects present different problems, require treatments; and Plutarch selects his
tools in accordance with the material he intends to carve—wearing away the knots in the wood,
the ambiguity of the grain, to fashion from its innermost fibers something more like itself. It
brings to mind Ezra Pound’s poetic indictment of Whitman, when he admits that although “It
was you that broke the new wood / Now is a time for carving” (“A Pact” 6-7). For Plutarch, it
was the early Greek historians—Herodotus, Thucydides, Callisthenes, Cleitarchus—who did the
work of breaking “the new wood,” since they not only wrote the histories that would become the
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sources of his biographies, but also established new ways of evaluating the questions of
historical validity, relevance and, most importantly, utility. And to this, Plutarch’s Lives are
undoubtedly indebted. The early historians offered Plutarch a way of thinking critically about the
past, but whereas a historian’s representation of life might amount to something like a catalogue
of deeds—or, in Latin, a res gestae: simply, “things done”—Plutarch’s tailor-made biographies,
although necessarily concerned with deeds, are crafted in order to explicate rather than merely
demonstrate the facts, the “things done.” And so it’s at this intersection, the intersection of
quantitative and qualitative speculation—the former concerned with veracity; the latter, value—
that Plutarch is most like the Poundian craftsman. He realized he was not writing history but life
itself. And although, like life, his portraits begin with the circumstances of the subject’s birth and
lineage, there is one peculiar exception. In his Life of Alexander, rather than beginning, as it
were, at the beginning, Plutarch takes a moment to speak directly to the reader:
I am not writing history but biography (βίος), and the most outstanding exploits do not
always have the property of revealing the goodness or badness of the agent; often, in fact, a
casual action, the odd phrase, or a jest reveals character better than battles involving the loss
of thousands upon thousands of lives, huge troop movements, and whole cities besieged. And
so, just as a painter reproduces his subject’s likeness by concentrating on the face and the
expression of the eyes, by means of which character is revealed, and pays hardly any
attention to the rest of the body, I must be allowed to devote more time to those aspects
which indicate a person’s mind and to use these to portray the life of each of my subjects,
while leaving their major exploits and battles to others. (Waterfield. trans).
“The others” to whom Plutarch leaves his subject’s “major exploits” are clearly the
historians, the cataloguers. But just as Plutarch stresses the comparative novelty of “biography”
as a means of investigating the past, he also stresses its similarity to the work of the painter.
Though he frees himself from the expectations of an exhaustive history, Plutarch’s painterly
analogy suggests that his ambition to reveal a “person’s mind.” That ambition is quite old—as
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old, even, as applying pigments to the rocks and the trees. To further illustrate this point, it helps
to tweak the translation of βίος, which is here taken to mean “biography”—but this is both true
and false. Taken literally, βίος means life; and at the time Plutarch set out to write his Lives, this
was the most useful description he had available.
We call Plutarch a biographer because we recognize his work to be biographical. We
seem him as a member of a group, a meaningfully connected class of writers who, whether
separated by millennia or decades, ultimately took up the same task. And even if other writers
like Ion of Chios and Diogenes Laërtius had already written works with a similar biographical
ambition, this doesn't mean that Plutarch’s contemporary readers would have recognized the
radically of what he was doing, or would have expected him to adopt any formal guidelines.
What was so revolutionary about Plutarch was not that he wrote “life,” but that he was the first to
conceive of life-writing as something emphatically apart from history, as something deserving of
a new name: biography. So Plutarch’s substitution of history for βίος actually does double-work:
it stresses both his departure from the historical tradition—the tradition of simply recording
“things done”—as well as his alignment with a more representative, poetic tradition, one that’s
concerned with the expression of character, feeling, or as Plutarch writes, a “person’s mind.”
But this still doesn’t shake off the ambiguity of the term; although it’s easy to understand
how history alone fails to communicate the ethical or psychological dimensions of a subject, it’s
not exactly clear what details or insights actually do manage to communicate these qualities. To
understand how Plutarch represents life and reveals the value of his subjects, it helps to look at
the the poets. Long before Plutarch began his project,
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Creatures of a day!
What is someone?
What is no one?
Man: a shadow’s dream.
But when god-given glory (kleos) comes
A bright light shines upon us and our life is sweet.
(Pindar, Goldstein. trans)
This fragment was written by Pindar in the fifth century B.C.E., the greatest of Greece’s
lyrical poets, to commemorate the victories of remarkable individuals at the Pythian, Olympic,
Isthmian, and Nemean games. Pindar’s poetry is one of the few windows we have onto Greek
values during the transition between the Archaic and Classical age; his commemorative odes
shed light on how the ancient Greeks determined the worthiness of lives, how they compared the
deeds of one individual to another and, consequently, constructed a shared conception of
normative and extraordinary lives.
In the penultimate line, “glory”—or kleos in the Greek—is typically swapped for
“renown” or “fame,” but these substitutions fail to capture the particular sonic qualities of the
word. It’s best to take kleos for something like “acoustic renown”—that is, what others hear
about you or, to add a kind of metric, the frequency with which your name is spoken. Odysseus,
for example, is a figure who abounds in kleos; and every time we read The Odyssey we lend him
new life, preserving his memory like Hestia’s flame against time and forgetfulness. It seems
strange then that Pindar would begin his ode to the kleos of victorious athletes with a rumination
on the inevitability of death. But there is something revelatory, even triumphant in his approach.
That we will die, Pindar reminds, is certain. But this fact isn’t meant to humble the newly
laureled, or to gather darker clouds for the sake of drama. The key to understanding the purpose
of this memento mori lies in the poem’s self-referentiality: in these lines, Pindar is less concerned
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with the kleos-winning deeds of particular men, than with his own role as a poet in the process of
kleos-making. It’s the actions of individuals that make them worth remembering, but it’s the
poets who create the memorial, who reify the “shadow’s dream,” and assuage the fear of death
with the possibility that our songs will be sung long after we’ve been put in the ground. The
victorious may have their trophies, but the real prize, Pindar suggests, is to become a subject
worthy of the poets’ art.
In achieving something extraordinary, you earned your song; and for the Greeks, for
whom the afterlife was a dull eternity in the underworld, this was about as close to immortality
as one could hope to get. Songs and poems, although they too come to an end, can be repeated
again and again; they become memorials outside of time and more lasting than stone. The
alternative was to be forgotten, which was a kind of secondary annihilation. And it’s this which
makes kleos such an emphatically social system of evaluating and remembering lives.
To be seen, or to be extraordinary wasn’t enough; one had to be both seen and
extraordinary. Only a public life, one lived in full view of the crowd, could achieve the necessary
visibility to secure kleos; there was little room in Athens’ pantheon of heroes for the saints toiling
in obscurity. And even if a poet like Pindar were to have written an ode on the virtues of a
shopkeeper, it’s very unlikely that the polis would sing his song. If we consider this, it makes the
most sense to take “glory” as the translation of kleos—since to call even the most virtuous
shopkeeper in the world “glorious” seems like overstatement. “Glory” is closer to “fame” than
“virtue.” Like the throne of an empire, “glory” is always won, taken or seized. And even when
it’s “found”—or, as Pindar calls it, “god-given”—it’s only ever after some superhuman exertion
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that it’s really obtained. The gates to glory are solid iron, and the poets don’t let just anyone
inside.
To get an idea of how the will to glory fits into ancient Greek art and life, it helps to look
at the character of Achilles who, in Book 9 of The Iliad, is given the choice to either secure his
kleos and die gloriously on the battlefield, or to return to a long but unsung life back in Ithaca.
Homer writes:
Mother tells me, the immortal goddess Thetis with her glistening feet, that two fates bear me
on to the day of death. If I hold out here and I lay siege to Troy, my journey home is gone,
but my glory (kleos) never dies. If I voyage back to the fatherland I love, my pride, my glory
(kleos) dies. (Iliad, 9.497, Fagles. trans)
To some extent Achilles’ fate is already decided; there’s no escaping the circumstances—
Paris took Helen; Agamemnon sailed—and now his options are limited to two: either sacrifice
his life or his kleos, both offering different shades of oblivion. Nevertheless, after days of
anguish, Achilles makes the only decision he could have made and kills Hector, sealing his fate
and winning his glory before the ruined walls of Troy. This is a noble sacrifice, a remarkable
display of selflessness. But Pindar would seem to suggest, in his work, that to sacrifice life for
eternal fame is more or less a fair trade. Regardless, a few years later, Odysseus comes across
Achilles in the underworld, fully expecting to find the hero resting on his laurels. But as
Odysseus begins to speak, declaring that “there’s not a man in the world more blest than you,”
the ghost of Achilles cuts in:
No winning words about death to me, shining Odysseus!
By god, I’d rather slave on earth for another man—
some dirt-poor tenant farmer who scrapes to keep alive—
than rule down here over all the breathless dead
(The Odyssey, 11.554, Fagles. trans).
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Achilles’ posthumous regret complicates the notion of kleos. Like Pindar, Homer is in the
business of kleos-making; it’s the theme that ties both epics together. But even so, this shift in
Achilles’ character suggests that kleos was a more complicated idea for the Greeks than Pindar’s
victory odes might lead us to believe. Considering the centrality of The Iliad and The Odyssey to
ancient Greek culture and identity, it’s reasonable to believe that most Greeks knew of Achilles’
posthumous change of heart, that they wouldn’t all have been as incredulous as Odysseus to find
the hero despairing in all his glory. As a metric for judging the value of our own lives or others,
kleos is actually quite limited. It equates being known with being worthy, which makes it unclear
whether someone is known because they are worthy, or if they are only worthy because they are
known. And there’s no rule that suggests the kleos of someone always be in proportion to their
virtue or equanimity. But this hardly needs saying. One doesn’t have to strain in order to think of
historical personalities who, although more or less condemned, are nevertheless spoken of as if
their memory were somehow indispensable. Kleos for the sake of kleos amounts to something
like celebrity infatuation. And of all Plutarch’s Lives, there are few that embody the complexity
and shortcomings of kleos as clearly as the Life of Alcibiades.
He was everything an Athenian should be—beautiful, intelligent, eccentric, humorous,
wealthy—remarkable in every sense. Plutarch writes that “even his lisp . . . made his
conversation charmingly persuasive” (223). And when he entered seven chariots into the
Olympic games—something that “no king” or “private citizen” had ever done before—he swept
the competition, gaining “more, in terms of distinction and renown, than anyone can ever have
hoped to have achieved” (229). Like Achilles, Alcibiades seemed destined for glory; he did
everything in a grand style. But he was also a conundrum. He resisted category. In 415 BCE,
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Alcibiades was accused of vandalizing the genitalia of the cult statues of the Herms. The polis
was furious. And Alcibiades, fearing for his life, slipped away before trial. Plutarch writes that he
defected to Sparta, adopted their customs and eventually led their forces to besiege Athens. Then,
in 411 BCE, whether out of forgiveness or desperation, the Athenians called Alcibiades back to
command the armada and overthrow the tyrants at Argos—a gesture which he must have found
touching, or at least politically expedient, since he promptly betrayed the Spartans. Alcibiades
returned from exile a hero—his death sentence expunged, and his betrayal forgiven. The
Athenians even threw the bronze stele that recorded his death verdict into the sea. Huge crowds
met his ship at the harbor with garlands and gifts and “once he was ashore,” Plutarch writes,
“people hardly even noticed any of the other military commanders” (252).
Athens’ adoration of Alcibiades was as capricious as his political alliances. When they
weren’t enraged, they were enchanted. But whether they loved him, or hated him—they were
always talking about him. Alcibiades’ kleos was a matter of fact. But it was also problematic. In
all things, he was “beyond the normal,” but this was especially true of his radical self-interest.
The Athenians repeatedly put their faith in a man whose loyalty was only to himself and, more
than once, they got burned for it. But how is that Alcibiades became the prodigal son of Athens?
It seems simplistic to assume that the Greeks subscribed wholesale to some Attic-variety of
modern celebrity culture—such comparisons are often tidier than plausible—but this might not
be too far from the truth. Athens was a complex society; Alcibiades was a complex man. But
regardless of how we characterize their relationship, it seems that Plutarch summarizes the
general feeling when he relates Archestratus’ remark that “Greece could not have endured two
Alcibiadeses” (235).

Page 14 of 47
Plutarch finds much to commend in Alcibiades, but the picture he gives us is inevitably
one of conflict. In fact, it’s Alcibiades’ inconsistency as a biographical subject that becomes the
whole point of Plutarch’s representation. In Poetics, Aristotle argues that when a character’s
actions are inconsistent, the tragedian ought to make them “consistently inconsistent”—so that
even in uncertainty, the audience finds something like identity. Plutarch seems to adopt this idea
in his comparison of Alcibiades to a “chameleon,” but he also complicates it. The analogy,
Plutarch warns, isn’t meant to suggest that his character was “infinitely mutable”; rather, “when
his real self was going to upset the people he was with, he assumed and took refuge in whatever
appearance and image was appropriate for them” (242). Plutarch’s interpretation is generous.
And at times his willingness to forgive seems to outdo even the Athenians. But his approach is
still critical. Plutarch acknowledges when Alcibiades’ shape-shifting was for his own benefit and
finds many occasions to wag an authorial finger at his “purple robes, and incredible
extravagance.” But his portrait is clearly more than invective. Plutarch’s intention is to reveal
something in Alcibiades’s character that, perhaps initially, he could only take on faith—a belief
that beneath the purple robes and chameleon skin there was something even grander than his
kleos: a “real self.”
The beginning of the Life is front loaded with a series of charming anecdotes. Before
anything else, and in quick succession, we see the best of Alcibiades: he cracks jokes, rebukes
his teachers, and convinces the Athenians to remove pipe-playing from the curriculum on the
grounds that it contorts his face. Even the anecdote in which Alcibiades punches Hipponicus
“just for fun”—and which seems to embody so much of the recklessness of his later life—is less
an attempt to make an even picture than an opportunity for Plutarch to describe how sincerely
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Alcibiades apologized to the bruised statesman. Except for a few general markers—“while he
was still a small boy”; “during his school days”—Plutarch orders these anecdotes with little
attention to their chronology; their only connection is thematic. And it’s only after these
connections have been made that Plutarch arrives at something like a chronological history of
Alcibiades’ life. It’s a storytelling tactic. Like a tinted eyeglass, which mutes certain colors and
makes others more vivid, Plutarch places these anecdotes at the beginning in order to bring a
new emphasis to what follows. The particular order in which Plutarch reveals the anecdotes of
Alcibiades’ life is vital to the success of his metaphors and analogies. And although Plutarch
admits in the introduction that “later in life” Alcibiades became “noticeably very inconsistent and
changeable,” he also adds that this is “perhaps not surprising given the importance of the
enterprises he was engaged on and the ups and downs of his fortunes” (223). The “perhaps” here
is careful rhetoric; Plutarch doesn’t want to commit—not yet, at least. Like most of his
biographies, it’s likely that Plutarch’s contemporary readers had some prior knowledge of his
subjects’ lives. And it seems this was especially true of Alcibiades. When Plutarch began writing
the Lives, Alcibiades’ kleos was in anything but short supply: he was a familiar character in
Plato’s dialogues, a common subject of Roman rhetoric and invective, and an indispensable
figure of Greek and Athenian history. It might have been this kleos—the continuous, ubiquitous
singing of Alcibiades’ extraordinary deeds—which initially inspired Plutarch to take a closer
look at his character. But the care with which Plutarch reorders and redirects the events of
Alcibiades’ life seems to suggest that he wanted his portrait to become more than another voice
in the chorus of kleos. In a sense, Plutarch wanted to rewrite Alcibiades’ song entirely.
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Plutarch’s assumption behind his treatment of Alcibiades life, as well as his other
subjects, is that a catalogue of an individual’s actions, especially an exhaustive one, does little to
communicate the subject’s character. Like Homer, Plutarch doesn’t merely present history—the
sum of the misfortunes and triumphs of an individual like Odysseus—he fashions a biography, a
collection of meaningfully connected events and anecdotes, that amounts to something like an
Odyssey, a story. Plutarch’s biographical process is more akin to the work of poets then, since he
doesn’t merely issue particular statements supported by fact—like the subject’s eye color or gait,
or what they did at a particular battle—but rather gets at the qualities which he believes impart a
truth more universal, more ethical than the simple reiteration of history or the sketching of a
profile.
Toward the end of the Life, Plutarch treads less lightly. His highly positive view of
Alcibiades steps out from behind the backs of anecdote and metaphor and he imagines the
Athenians looking “back with remorse over all their mistakes and misjudgments, and now
considered that the most stupid thing they had done was get angry with Alcibiades for the second
time” (258). Plutarch neither blames the Athenians entirely, nor concludes that Alcibiades was
flawless. He rests his case somewhere in between guilt and innocence. On the whole, this
interpretation seems more hopeful than plausible. The Life includes much evidence for and
against Alcibiades, but ultimately Plutarch gives his subject the benefit of the doubt and, like the
Athenians, tosses his guilty verdict into the sea. Plutarch was neither the first nor the greatest of
Alcibiades’ apologists—but he’s apparently in good company. Among all the adoring crowds of
Athens, it was Socrates who first noticed in Alcibiades what Plutarch would later call his “true
self.”
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As a character in the Life, Socrates is an indispensable authority; he was the lover and
teacher of Alcibiades. In Plato’s Symposium, we see something of their relationship when
Alcibiades jealously attempts to steal Agathon’s seat next to Socrates by means of drunken
eulogy. In this scene, while Socrates clearly admires Alcibiades, he also seems weary. Plato,
perhaps, had less tolerance for Alcibiades than Socrates, but his dialogues still maintain the
character of their intimate, yet conflicted relationship. Plutarch’s belief in the goodness of
Alcibiades’ “real self” owes much to the apparent faith Socrates had in his brilliant but
temperamental pupil. The fact that Socrates loved Alcibiades, Plutarch argues, “strongly suggests
that the boy was endowed with a natural aptitude for virtue” (224). But, like all things in
Alcibiades’ life, this “virtue” was unstable and prone to change. And even with his “natural
aptitude” and Socrates as his guide, the force of Alcibiades’ chameleon personality and endless
pursuit of recognition made him one of philosophy’s most notoriously intractable students:
It was actually by pandering to his ambitious longing for recognition that his corrupters set
him prematurely on the road of high endeavor; they convinced him that as soon as he took up
politics, he would not merely eclipse all the other military commanders and popular leaders,
but would gain more power and prestige among the Greeks than even Pericles enjoyed. Just
as iron, then, is softened in the fire, but is hardened again by cold and reconstitutes his own
compact nature, so time and again Socrates took him back in a state of complete promiscuity
and presumptuousness, and by force of argument would pull him together and teach him
humility and restraint, by showing him how great his flaws were and how far he was from
virtue. (Waterfield. trans).
Socrates philosophical relationship to Alcibiades is similar to Plutarch’s biographical one.
Both sought to bring out the best in him. And both, perhaps, were too forgiving. But Plutarch’s
forgiveness reveals much about the ethical intentions behind his biographical project.
Throughout the Lives, Plutarch’s character-building, and especially the logic and justification
behind his revelation of Alcibiades’ “real self,” shows an obvious indebtedness to the works of
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Aristotle. In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle’s central issue is the relationship between ethos
(ἦθος) and virtue or arête (ἀρετή). Ethos is typically taken to mean “character,” but a more direct
translation helps clarify Aristotle’s particular usage. Literally, ethos is an “accustomed place,” the
place where one is found, that is, at least most of the time. Fish, lions, stars, clouds, individual
humans—each have an ethos of their own. Aristotle’s idea is that one’s “accustomed place” is the
consequence of repeated action. Through habit we create ethos, our character. But how could
Plutarch be so sure of Alcibiades’ true dwelling, his “real self”? His only habit seems to have
been the continual shrugging off of old faces for new. Plutarch addresses part of the problem in
his “consistently inconsistent” chameleon analogy, but still largely assumes the often obscured,
yet inherent virtue of Alcibiades’ character.
Just as habit creates ethos, ethos also creates habit. It was the “corrupters,” Plutarch
argues, who fueled Alcibiades’ tendency to indulge in and seek flattery, to love fame and kleos as
an ends in themselves. They warped Alcibiades’ “real self” in the fires of political and material
temptation. Although Plutarch blames his subject’s “corrupters,” he also makes it clear that they
seem to have entertained something in Alcibiades that was already there. And this stands for the
good in Alcibiades as well; time and again, Socrates retrieved his beloved pupil from
presumptuousness and put him on the path of the good and beautiful—but ultimately it seems
that Socrates was leading Alcibiades back to his self. It was to his own “compact nature” that he
returned when in the presence of Socrates, just as he returned to his own “ambitious longing for
recognition” and kleos when in the presence of his “corrupters.” While Socrates guided his pupil
towards virtue or arête, the panderers enticed him with promises of glory and kleos. And it seems
only one side could win. Like Achilles, Alcibiades’ choice would come to define his memory.
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Considering his later life and problematic political career, it may already be clear that Alcibiades
failed to fulfill the potential of his “real self,” that Socrates’ love for his virtue, perhaps,
eventually felt small in comparison to the polis’ infatuation with his unyielding will to glory.
Plutarch seems to believe that, while Alcibiades’ habits and actions suggest his desire for a life of
song rather than one of virtue, it’s still possible to retrieve the remnants of his “real” and
righteous self. But to understand why Plutarch chose to redeem the memory of a man whose
better-half even Socrates couldn’t save, it helps to take a closer look at the general function of
arête in the Lives as a whole.
Arête is commonly translated to “virtue.” But, similar to kleos, to understand the word in
all of its contexts, it requires multiple substitutions, each with their own shade of meaning. On
arête, the philosopher Alexander Nehamas writes, “We could do no better, I suggest, than to
think of it as that quality or set of qualities that makes something an outstanding member of the
group to which it belongs. Arête is the feature that accounts for something being justifiably
notable” (Nehamas 78). Arête, like kleos, is a quality that makes someone worth talking about.
But this is as far as Nehamas would take the comparison. One can be notable, even
extraordinary, but in order to achieve arête one’s actions must be “justifiably” so. Alcibiades’
betrayal of Athens, for example, was notable—it also made him an “outstanding” member of his
polis—but if there is any moral value in Alcibiades’ betrayal, it’s only in its service as a model to
not follow. Of particular importance is the claim that arête belongs to an “outstanding member of
a group”. This can be read in two ways. On the surface, Nehamas’ use of “outstanding” is clearly
ethical: the famous virtue of Socrates, for example, is “outstanding.” But we can also take
“outstanding” quite literally, as a quality that makes someone stand out, that makes them
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anything but normal. The double-meaning behind Nehamas’ use of the word is similar to the
double-meaning behind the kleos: both equate being known with being worthy. But this
comparison also suggests differentiation.
It’s telling that, while avoiding the usual translation of arête to “virtue,” Nehamas
supplies a word that seems more representative of celebrity kleos than Socrates’ ethical character.
It’s a clear evocation of Alcibiades; and Nehamas’ suggestion seems to be that in order to
understand arête one also has to understand kleos. The most emphatic difference is that arête
accounts for what makes something “justifiably notable”; but, Nehamas adds, the criteria with
which to judge what is or isn’t “justifiably notable” is dependent on the nature of the “group to
which it belongs.” Arête, like ethos or one’s “accustomed place,” isn’t limited to people. It can
apply to lions and fish, too; in a sense, arête is the kleos of things. It takes on different meanings
in different contexts. Arête is subtle and less confrontational than kleos. We discover the arête of
other people; it’s revealed over long habit or all at once, but it’s only understood after careful
attention. It can’t be shared or sung the same way as Alcibiades’ chariot race, for example, since
arête lacks entertainment value. The value it does have is immaterial—it’s good for the sake of
being good. Kleos dries up without the participation of others; but in gaining arête, the crowd is
completely beside the point. The only necessary recognition is self-recognition. Plato, speaking
for Alcibiades in the Symposium, says it best in the opening lines of his eulogy, which might as
well be the song of Socrates:
For I say he is likest to the Silenus-figures that sit in the statuaries' shops; those, I mean,
which our craftsmen make with pipes or flutes in their hands: when their two halves are
pulled open, they are found to contain images of gods (Fowler. trans).
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Pindar wanted to revel in kleos; he didn’t waste time opening up a person’s soul to find
something like arête. Kleos is loud; we sing it so the dead can hear their names. Arête hides
away; it’s the shopkeeper of whom the poets never sing. It seems likely, then, that before
Plutarch set out to reveal Alcibiades’ “real self,” the memory of Alcibiades was largely still one
of runaway kleos; and although the Alcibiades of Plato’s dialogues must have complicated this
picture, it’s clear that Plutarch felt the work wasn’t done.
Many flatters and lovers presented themselves to Alcibiades in his youth—and for the
most part he treated them with kindness and respect—but Socrates, Plutarch repeatedly insists,
stood apart from the rest. They were tent mates during the campaign against Potidaea; and
Plutarch seems to relish the picture he paints when he relates the anecdote in which Socrates
saves Alcibiades life along with “his arms and armor,” fighting off several Corinthians in the
process (227). This is the most vivid image of Socrates in the Life of Alcibiades—elsewhere, he’s
a rhetorical device, another authority to cite—and, by itself, it offers a useful representation of
Socrates’ role in the Life as a whole. Plutarch wants the reader to dramatize; and to see
Alcibiades and Socrates as the ill-fated lovers of one another’s inner-most souls isn’t perhaps too
far off. The anecdote from Potidaea, too, seems to beg for melodrama. It’s more than an event;
it’s a scene of singular, thematic force—not only for the Life of Alcibiades, but for all of
Plutarch’s biographies.
By any standard, Alcibiades was a difficult biographical subject, a challenge to the form.
Like Socrates, Plutarch sticks his neck out for Alcibiades; even if the greatest enemy of his arête
was his own reputation, both believed he had an ethos worth fighting for. For Socrates, this took
the form of philosophical argument; he wanted Alcibiades’ habits to reflect his soul, not his love
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of kleos. Plutarch’s fight for Alcibiades’ better half also took the form of an argument—most of
which he owes to the ethics of Plato and Aristotle—but instead of altering his subject’s habits or
deeds, he reorders and redirects them. In short, Plutarch tells a story, unfolds the life again—but
this time with new emphasis and to new ends. Plutarch might have identified with his image of
the warrior Socrates; but rather than defending his subject’s body or soul, Plutarch defends his
memory. And in his mind, perhaps, it was a greater evil for a biographer to leave a diamond in
the rough, and thus waste a life’s virtue, than attempt to find good where there is none. In a
sense, the veracity of a biography seems less important than the end to which it is written: if the
moral character represented in the retelling of a life is good, then so too will be the effect on its
reader. In the opening lines of his Life of Emilius, Plutarch lays out this idea, as well as his
ethical ambition:
I began the writing of my ‘Lives’ for the sake of others, but I find that I am continuing the
work and delighting in it now for my own sake also, using history as a mirror and
endeavoring in a manner to fashion and adorn my life in conformity with the virtues therein
depicted. For the result is like nothing else than daily living and associating together, when I
receive and welcome each subject of my history in turn as my guest, so to speak, and observe
carefully ‘how large he was and of what mien,’ and select from his career what is most
important and most beautiful to know. And oh! What greater joy than this canst thou obtain,
and more efficacious for moral improvement? Democritus says we ought to pray that we may
be visited by phantoms which are propitious, and that from out the circumambient air such
only may encounter us as are agreeable to our natures and good, rather than those which are
perverse and bad, thereby intruding into philosophy a doctrine which is not true, and which
leads astray into boundless superstitions.
It’s through a familiarity with the lives of great individuals, Plutarch argues, that the
readers of the Lives will learn to practice their virtues. Of particular importance, is that Plutarch
makes no mention of historical veracity; the only falsehoods he hopes to dispel are the
“boundless superstitions” of philosophy. Historical seriousness doesn’t seem to be a part of
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Plutarch’s moral equation. But this reveals much about Plutarch’s project. In his “Defense of
Seneca and Plutarch,” Montaigne calls Plutarch a “philosopher who teaches us virtue”; Emerson,
in his essay on the biographer, writes that the Plutarch’s “delight in magnanimity and selfsacrifice has made his books, like Homer’s Iliad, a bible for heroes.” Plutarch’s intention is to
inspire his readers to emulate the best of lives. And, more often than not, this seems to be
achieved through a heavy revision and careful reinterpretation of the works of both the historians
and poets alike, as it is in the case of Alcibiades. But this isn’t to say that Plutarch consciously
invents virtue where there is none, or that he was in short supply of exemplary models from
which to write the Lives. In his essay on Plutarch, Emerson continues:
In his immense quotation and allusion we quickly cease to discriminate between what he quotes
and what he invents. We sail on his memory into the ports of every nation, enter into every
private property, and do not stop to discriminate owners, but give him the praise of all. Tis all
Plutarch, by right of eminent domain, and all property vests in this emperor.
“Tis all Plutarch,” indeed: the subjects are his to choose, and their lives are his to recreate. It’s his
show. Emerson considers Plutarch an experienced historian of “immense quotation and allusion.”
In other words, he trusts his method. But he also trusts the end to which Plutarch mobilizes his
historical materials. Although it’s hard to discern the veracity of a portrait like that of Alcibiades,
for example, it seems like truth is beside Plutarch’s ethical point. For Emerson, Plutarch’s
reliability is less important than his good will. If anyone will tell a lie, he seems to say, then let it
be told by a man who understands virtue. It’s hard to disagree with Emerson’s sentiment. The
historians gather fact and fashion a likely picture; the biographers gather life and fashions likely
character. Both outcomes are less than perfect. But ultimately the latter feels more true every
time.
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When Plutarch was born in 46 AD to a family of Greek aristocrats in the Boeotian town
of Chaeronea, Greek lands had been under Roman control for nearly two hundred years. And the
Greeks themselves occupied a strange, if capricious place in the Roman imagination. On one
hand, the Greek’s were a conquered people, and the Romans treated them as such: their cities
were occupied, their men were forced into conscription, and local trade and military matters were
largely handled by urban Roman officials more concerned with imperial rather than Greek
interests. On the other hand, the Romans were the original Graecophiles: their scholars studied
and translated philosophy and rhetoric at the platonic Academy in Athens; their craftsmen and
artists shipped plaster casts of Hellenistic statuary across the empire; and even their Greek slaves
were often guaranteed relatively undemanding roles as the servants to urban, aristocratic
households. In other words, as Simon Goodwill argues, “In the Roman empire all are insiders,
but some are more insiders than others” (Goldhill 354). As both an aristocrat, and a scholar
interested in the complex, shared history of Greece and Rome, it seems likely that Plutarch was
an “insider”. Plutarch’s privileged position as an educated Greek under the Roman empire is,
perhaps, what initially allowed him access to the documents and sources upon which he founded
the Lives. But this same position also seems to have inspired Plutarch’s choice of subjects.
Plutarch’s comparisons of famous Roman and Greek figures seem to have had a
particularly urgent message. In his Life of Galba, Plutarch recalls some of the more tumultuous
years of the Roman Empire: “The Caesars’ house in Rome, the Palladium, received in a shorter
space of time no less than four emperors, passing, as it were, across the stage, and one making
room for another to enter.” Plutarch’s comparison of succession to the passing of actors across a
stage suggests something of his dissatisfaction with Roman imperial politics. In the years leading
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up to Plutarch’s life, the Roman people endured a number of spectacularly cruel and extravagant
emperors, including the notoriously nefarious figures of Caligula and Nero. And although the
examples of virtue found in the Lives could service any student of philosophy, his choice of
subjects suggest that Plutarch was more concerned with teaching the virtue’s of the dead to those
in a position of power. Considering that Plutarch’s Lives would have been heard and read aloud,
not to mention incredibly expensive, it’s likely that any contemporary readings of his biographies
would’ve occurred in rooms with marble floors, rather than on the dirt or in the homes of
plebeians.
Thucydides, a Greek historian, argues that the only work a historian should write is a
history for his own present moment (Greenwood 39). and, in a sense, Plutarch is of a similar
camp. His biographies were designed to address the specific problems of the Roman empire of
the first century; he wrote for an audience that would have recognizes the parallels between
Julius Caesar and Alexander the Great; but, even now, two millennia later, the utility of
Plutarch’s Lives is far from spent. And this is because Plutarch’s subject is human nature just as
much as it is specific humans. By relating the best lives, Plutarch offered not so much a present
history, but a mirror with which we come to know the value of ourselves and others.
In the Life of Alexander, Plutarch relates an anecdote in which Alexander is brought a
priceless casket taken from a Persian king. His companions and friends made various suggestion
as to what treasure Alexander should place inside but Alexander, Plutarch writes “said that he
would put the Iliad there for safe keeping.” Following this, Alexander has a dream “in which a
grey-haired, distinguished-looking man came up to him and quoted the following lines: “Now,
there is a certain island in the restless, churning sea / Lying before Egypt: Pharos is the name
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men give it (336). The “grey-haired” man seems to be Homer. Alexander eventually founded the
city of Alexandria at “Pharos”. This story, like most things surrounding and depicting
Alexander’s life, is most likely apocryphal. But it helps to reveal something of Plutarch’s
ambition. Like the Homer of Alexander’s dream, Plutarch summons the ghosts of the past in
order to help make a future. History has its lessons, but its only in the work of biography that a
life is felt, that Democritus’ “phantoms” of the past seem to filter out of the “circumambient air.”
Of all the Lives, the Life of Alexander is the longest. In the first few pages, Plutarch
wastes no time introducing a host of analogies and symbols which he develops over the course of
the Life. Unlike his comparison of the ever protean Alcibiades to a “chameleon,” which was
Plutarch’s own invention, most of the symbols and themes in his portrait of Alexander were
already commonplace before he began writing the Lives. The most important of these is fire.
Olympias, Alexander’s mother, has a dream in which her womb is struck by a thunderbolt and
suddenly “burst into flames,” engulfing the rest of the palace; after which, Philip dreamed that he
was pressing a seal on his wife’s womb with “the figure of a lion”. Most of Philip’s diviners,
Plutarch relates, interpreted these dreams to mean that Olympias was probably unfaithful. But
Plutarch includes these nameless interpreters only to introduce Aristander—Alexander’s chief
soothsayer and must trusted interpreter of omen throughout his life—who takes their dreams to
mean that the child Olympias was carrying would be “impatient and lion-like.” Plutarch also
relates that on the day of Alexander’s birth “the temple of Artemis at Ephesus was destroyed by
fire” (313).
Although Plutarch anticipates his reader’s knowledge, and warns that his portrait will
make use of certain events while ignoring others, it seems that he packs the first few pages to the
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brim. In quick succession, Plutarch relates a series of omens that suggest much of Alexander’s
later life: a snake found alongside Olympias is interpreted as a sign that “she was a partner to a
higher being”; an oracle from Delphi tells Philip to honor “Ammon” more than any other god;
and Plutarch relates an anecdote in which Alexander hears from his mother the “secret of his
birth” while on the “eastern campaign.” All this, too, before Plutarch even mentions Alexander’s
birth.
The particular density of these opening paragraphs is largely characteristic of Plutarch’s
other biographies. In the introduction to the Life of Alcibiades, for example, Plutarch drives
home a few key points: he’s beautiful, but also changeable. And these two themes—which create
the central conflict of Alcibiades’ character—take on new meaning and new complexities as the
Life unfolds. The revelation of character happens gradually, but Plutarch intends these themes to
serve as a guide, a way to guarantee that both his readers arrive at the same conclusion. It’s clear
from the beginning that Plutarch believes the legends and prophecies of Alexander’s life reveal
his character, especially since he takes Aristander as his initial authority on Alexander’s nature.
But Plutarch’s reliance on myth is, perhaps, necessary. The legends and histories grew up around
Alexander almost immediately after his death; more often than not, these accounts take
contradictory stances on who Alexander was.
Plutarch’s interest in Alexander was nothing new. By the time he began writing his
biographical project, there were already two well-established and divergent traditions of
Alexandrian life-writing, which branched out in different directions from a small, now lost
collection of eyewitness accounts written by those who knew him. The first of these is called the
“vulgate tradition”—which stems from vulgus: Latin for “common people”—and began with the
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writings of Cleitarchus. Although we know almost nothing about the historian himself, we do
know that Cleitarchus completed his History of Alexander sometime between 310 and 301 BCE,
which makes his account one of the few near-contemporary sources on Alexander’s life. In short,
the History of Alexander is a popular narrative—romantic details and forays into the fantastic
abound—but what made Cleitarchus’ account so unique is that he primarily worked from the
eye-witness accounts of soldiers: namely, the memoirs of Onesicritus of Astypalaea and
Nearchus, Alexander’s helmsman and his fleet-commander. In addition, since Cleitarchus wrote
his History while living in Alexandria, it’s likely that he had many opportunities to speak directly
with Macedonian and Greek veterans, whose accounts shed light on the less-than-epic details of
Alexander’s campaigns. Unfortunately, and despite its popularity, the History of Alexander is
now lost. We only know Cleitarchus’ writings through the tertiary sources of Diodorus and
Curtius Rufus, latter writers of the “vulgate tradition” who often relate Cleitarchus’ soldiers’
stories in nearly identical words.
The “good tradition” began with Callisthenes of Olynthus, a nephew to Aristotle and
career historian who, under Alexander’s employment, functioned as a kind of professional
flatterer. Callisthenes wrote the Deeds of Alexander, which is now lost. And although, similar to
the works of Cleitarchus, it’s possible to reconstruct Callisthenes’ writings by working
backwards from secondary and tertiary sources, there are numerous anecdotes in Plutarch’s Life
of Alexander that already do some of the work for us. Like in the passage where Alexander
thrusts a spear through his friend Clitus and is immediately thrown into regretful despair,
Plutarch describes Callisthenes as dealing “with his suffering by tactful and gentle means, using
euphemisms and circumlocutions to avoid giving pain” (361). It’s easy to imagine how this kind
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of flattery—the subtle omissions, the turning of words—could characterize the Deeds of
Alexander as a whole; it was, after all, nothing less than official propaganda. And there’s no
doubt that Callisthenes, by his position alone, was less concerned with receiving the critics’
laurels than with securing his employer’s favor. Callisthenes stands apart from other Alexandrian
writers because his subject could talk back, could affirm or challenge the details of his own
image. And although it’s hard to say to what extent Alexander actually exercised his own
editorial hand, it’s clear that Callisthenes wrote the Deeds of Alexander in order to flatter its
commissioner and enchant its readers, rather than satisfy any precepts of historical validity. But,
like any other position in Alexander’s court, the benefits were as spectacular as the risks. And
Plutarch, among others, suggest that Callisthenes' circumlocutions and flattery eventually failed
him. Alexander’s favor gave way to contempt; and the historian of Alexander’s court, depending
on who we believe, was either crucified or died a slow death in chains.
Like Callisthenes, Ptolemy I Soter was a member of Alexander’s often precarious innercircle of companions and bodyguards. He was never promoted to the ranks of the core
commanders, but he seems to have served some indispensable function for Alexander. The king
kept him close, heeded his advice; and they remained intimate friends from childhood until
Alexander’s untimely death in 323 BCE. Ptolemy’s proximity to the king helped to secure his
position as one of the three diadochi, or potential successors to the newly vacant throne. Almost
immediately after Alexander’s death—as the king’s commanders and friends began the long fight
for control of the heirless empire—Ptolemy was appointed the satrap of Egypt, where he
eventually wrote his memoirs of the Alexandrian campaign.
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Ptolemy’s memoirs, also now lost, represent the continuation of the “good tradition.” We
know from later sources—namely, Arrian of Nicomedia, a contemporary of Plutarch, whose
work on Alexander’s conquest of Asia claims Ptolemy as its main authority—that the memoirs
relied extensively on Callisthenes’ official court history; we also know that Ptolemy took time to
correct a number of details in Cleitarchus, which places the publication of his memoirs at some
point between 310 and 301 BCE. That Ptolemy began his memoirs more than two decades after
the fact might explain his reliance on Callisthenes’ bookkeeping; but this remove also poses a
question. Why did Ptolemy publish his memoirs in this particular window of time? And,
moreover, to what end did he write the past?
To guess at this, it helps to know something of the political landscape Alexander left in
his wake. In short, there was no contingency plan for an empty throne; it hadn’t seemed
necessary. Alexander had literally marched his armies off the map, had conquered the known
world and then some. At the empire’s height, he had brought more than two-million square miles
of land under the Macedonian yoke. He believed he was the son of Zeus, of Ammon; and even
those who quietly challenged the king’s claim to divinity could hardly argue that his ambition,
courage and strategical brilliance were anything less than god-like. After his death, Alexander’s
possessions and empty armor were treated like cult objects, the still living symbols of the world’s
greatest conqueror. And who, from even among the best of us, could replace a man like that?
There’s an anecdote found in a few ancient sources which tells us that when the dying
Alexander was asked to whom his power should pass, he replied, “To the strongest.” These
sources are questionable; but, whether true or fictive, Alexander’s response anticipates the
bloody contest that was eventually held over his throne. Like planets suddenly deprived of their
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star, the death of Alexander threw the once harmonious inner-circle of companions into a state of
utter chaos. The newly-won empire devolved into an ever-shifting jigsaw of alliances and petty
rivalries. And it was Perdiccas, a high-ranking chiliarch and commander of the cavalry, who was
the first to come out of the fray with a more or less legitimate claim to the throne. After
executing some of his louder detractors and reaching a tenuous compromise among the other
companions, Perdiccas became the regent to Arridaeus—the mentally unstable, epileptic halfbrother of Alexander—and appointed Ptolemy, among other allies, as the satraps or governors of
the empire’s far flung provinces. Perdiccas’ plan was to spread the circle of companions as thinly
as possible. With the potential usurpers sent to the periphery of the empire, and the king’s halfbrother in tow, it seemed that Perdiccas had already secured his throne. But the succession of
power was far from complete. And, more than anyone, it was the dead king who seemed to stand
in Perdiccas’ way.
In 321 BCE, nearly two years after his death, Alexander still had yet to receive the burial
rites of a king. In Macedonian culture, it was customary for a new ruler to bury his predecessor’s
body; it was a transaction of power, the crown relaying between the living and the dead. So, in a
sense, if it was Alexander’s death that ignited the wars of the diadochi, it would be his burial that
finally put things to rest. But the question of who was as important as where. Macedonian
tradition demanded burial at Aegae, the royal tombs where Alexander’s father Philip II had been
interred. But according to Curtius Rufus, Alexander’s own wishes were to be buried at the
Temple of Zeus-Ammon in Egypt, indicating his desire to be remembered as the son of a god
rather than the son of a man. Perdiccas and the diadochi knew that Alexander’s body was a
commodity, a living symbol even in death; and, like a seed planted in soil, his burial would be
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less a conclusion than a beginning. To bury Alexander at Aegae would have stressed his blood
relation to Arridaeus, consequently strengthening Perdiccas’ position as the proxy successor.
Perdiccas wanted Alexander to remembered as a king, but a burial at the Temple of ZeusAmmon would ultimately achieve the opposite effect: he would become more myth than man.
He would be remembered as a conqueror who had become so much more than a Macedonian,
who had defeated the god-kings of Persia and adopted their robes and customs, who had turned
his back on his mortal father and claimed to be more than human, the son of a god. But what was
expedient for Perdiccas and his allies, wasn’t necessarily expedient for the other diadochi. As the
satrap of Egypt, Ptolemy had the most to gain from Alexander’s posthumous deification. And in
December of 321 BCE, as Arridaeus and the convoy carrying the king’s body stopped in
Damascus en route to Aegae, Ptolemy made his move.
It’s not exactly clear what happened—some sources suggest it was simply an instance of
of bodysnatching, while others argue that the exchange was premeditated—but what we know
for certain is that Alexander’s body never made it to Aegae after falling into Ptolemy’s hands.
The papyrologist H. Idris Bell implies that Ptolemy may have led others to believe that he was
simply obeying Alexander’s last wishes (Egypt from Alexander the Great to the Arab Conquest).
But this might have been hard to believe even then; the political benefit was just too obvious to
overlook. It’s also unlikely that the exchange in Damascus was as amicable as some sources
suggest, especially when we consider that almost immediately afterwards Perdiccas sent troops
to retrieve the body and overthrow Ptolemy’s satrapy. But the contradictions in these competing
histories of Alexander’s posthumous adventures are telling. Typically, it’s the writers of the
“good tradition”—those who take Ptolemy and Callisthenes as their authorities—who paint
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Arridaeus as readily handing over Alexander’s body, even though this seems like needless selfsabotage on Arridaeus’ part. But expediency overcomes validity. And although we may never
know exactly what happened in Damascus, or how Ptolemy came to acquire the most coveted
corpse on Earth, it’s clear that in seizing Alexander’s body Ptolemy also seized something of
Alexander’s myth.
Had Perdiccas not been killed by his own troops during his disastrous campaign in Egypt,
it’s possible that he would have written a memoir in which we would see Ptolemy the usurper,
the grave robber. But history goes to the victors. And even if Ptolemy did willfully whitewash the
events in Damascus, this didn’t stop later historians of the “good tradition” from taking his
memoirs as their authority. But this isn’t to say that these historians were uncritical. In the the
preface of the Anabasis, Arrian of Nicomedia justifies his reliance on Ptolemy “not only because
he accompanied Alexander in his expedition, but also because he was himself a king afterwards,
and falsification of facts would have been more disgraceful to him than to any other
man” (Anabasis, p.7). The last remark is dubious; but Arrian’s justification suggests an important
characteristic about the “good tradition” and its adherents: they held the primary source or
eyewitness account above all other forms of historical evidence. In other words, to have seen the
man was to know the truth; and the greater the remove, the greater the lie—a conceit that,
although critical in spirit, fails to consider the particular end to which a history is written. There’s
no doubt that Callisthenes and Ptolemy employed a privileged knowledge of Alexander and his
life in their writings—the former essentially wrote over the king’s shoulder; the latter was among
his closest friends—but what makes Arrian’s justification so ironic is that, more than anything,
it’s the proximity of these writers that guarantees their unreliability.
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In the Lives, Plutarch mentions the sculptor Lyssipus as the only artist whom Alexander
felt was skillful enough to make his image. And it’s likely that Alexander felt similarly towards
Callisthenes—that is, before demanding his execution. Both were the crafters of image—the
former in marble, the latter in prose—but their mediums ultimately achieved different things. In
Nemean 5, a poem commissioned by the family of a victorious Greek athlete, Pindar argues the
difference:
I am not a sculptor, so as to fashion stationary
statues that stand on their same base.
Rather, on board every ship
and in every boat, sweet song,
go forth . . . and spread the news. (W. H. Race. trans).
We might expect Callisthenes’ Deeds of Alexander to have been the prose equivalent of Lyssipus’
statues; since both fashioned their portraits in the company of a living sitter, they both expressed
the actual gaze, the actual posture: the life as it was really lived. In regard to Lysippus’ statues,
it’s reasonable to believe that his representation of Alexander would have been recognizable to
those who actually knew him. Even if the sculptor took certain cosmetic or symbolic liberties,
his depiction was still one taken from life. That Lyssipus was Alexander’s only sculptor suggests
how concerned the king was with his reputation; an unsolicited portrait might have confused the
myth he wanted to create. But marble and bronze were expensive; and statues weren’t
commissioned by the common people, the soldiers, they were commissioned by city-states and
kings. Cleitarchus’ soldiers’ stories were the only true common monument. Pindar also points out
that the works of a sculptor don’t travel, they “stand on their same base” and transmit their
message only to those who see it, while a poem, a “sweet song” gives flight, spreads itself
throughout the world “on board every ship / and in every boat.” As a king who was obsessed
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with reputation, Alexander could expect the writers of song and story to carry his legacy further
than sculptors ever could. And even if Callisthenes was a historian rather than a poet, it seems
that he wrote the Deeds of Alexander with a similar ambition: his history wasn’t made to sit and
gather dust, it was a song to be sung.
In other words, Callisthenes was a writer of kleos, too. But, unlike Pindar, Callisthenes
wasn’t in the business of tombstone-making or of assuaging our mortal anxiety with promises of
poetic remembrance; the Deeds of Alexander seems to have been less a memorial of the past than
a myth for the future. To be remembered wasn’t enough; Alexander wanted to be remembered on
his own terms. But this isn’t to say that Callisthenes' account would have been more credible if
he had been more removed from Alexander’s myth-making; this would have simply traded
whitewashing for uncertainty. We can choose to believe whatever comes out of the horse’s mouth
or we can choose to believe a different horse entirely; there’s something of value in each and
both have their obvious shortcomings. All this to say, when trying to get at the truth, historians
often have to be as credulous as they are incredulous. And although Callisthenes was a flatterer
and outright propagandist, one has to believe his history just as one has to believe Lyssipus’
portraits— for even if they are fictions, they are at least Alexander’s fictions. Moreover,
Cleitarchus’ soldier’s stories, too, would have suggested their own half-truths. Callisthenes
writes from the center, Cleitarchus moves in from the periphery, but both take Alexander and his
conquests as their subject, and both create works of equal parts myth and history—with the truth,
perhaps, lying somewhere in between.
Like his body, the myth Alexander helped create would be inevitably appropriated by
those who were closest to him. New revisions meant new ends for which the story could be told.
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And when Ptolemy took Alexander’s body from Damascus to Egypt, it also seems that he took
Callisthenes’ pen. For Alexander’s life was an open book, a palimpsest; and to write his myth
was to bury him again, whether in new or familiar soil—by the side of his father, in the house of
a god—as if death were merely the pretext for some greater conquest. Ptolemy won Egypt when
he captured the body of a god; but it wasn’t until he had lost nearly everything that he
appropriated Alexander’s myth.
In 306 BCE, after nearly two decades of war among the diadochi, it seemed that
Ptolemy’s control of Egypt was finally coming to an end. Antigonus, one of Alexander’s
Macedonian generals, had crushed Ptolemy’s navy off the shores of Cyprus; the remaining ships
retreated in disarray and the satrap’s brother, Menelaus, had no choice but to surrender the island.
Ptolemy’s defeat was total. “Upon this,” Plutarch writes, “the multitude for the first time saluted
Antigonus and Demetrius as kings. Antigonus, accordingly, was immediately crowned by his
friends, and Demetrius received a diadem from his father” (Life of Demetrius 18). To assume the
royal diadem at this particular moment was a hugely symbolic gesture. Alexander first adopted
the diadem after defeating Darius III; and, although similar to the Greek wreath, which had
become a symbol of semi-divinity, the oriental diadem symbolized divinity outright. Alexander’s
appropriation of Darius III’s divine status ingratiated himself with the conquered Persians and
legitimized Macedonian rule after conquest. With this symbol in Antigonus’ possession, it
seemed that the fractured empire would again unite beneath the diadem of a god-king, that a
ruler of Alexander’s caliber had finally emerged from the fray.
Antigonus’ diadem was an even greater threat to Ptolemy’s rule than the loss of his navy,
since afterwards Plutarch writes that even the satrap’s own subjects began to acknowledge
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Antigonus’ legitimacy. But Ptolemy wouldn’t let himself be outdone. In the same year he,
Lysimachus of Thrace, and Seleucus of Babylonia all adopted diadems of their own. Ptolemy,
however, seems to have believed that this was a feeble gesture. The diadem was a powerful
symbol, but symbols alone can’t defeat armies. And without a navy, Ptolemy was vulnerable; he
desperately needed the support of the local Egyptian population. So in 304 BCE, he went a step
further and, perhaps taking after Alexander’s own policy of cultural fusion, declared himself the
pharaoh of Egypt.
All this to say, with the future of his kingdom so uncertain, there was a never a better
time for Ptolemy to write the past. In the Anabasis, Arrian tells us that Ptolemy criticized
Cleitarchus’ History of Alexander, which places the publication of his memoirs somewhere in the
spread between 310 and 301 BCE. But perhaps now we can be more exact. Through Arrian, we
can infer that the memoirs made little to no mention of Antigonus and his successful invasion of
Asian Minor; Ptolemy seems to have entirely scratched his rival’s military achievements from
the record. And, on top of this, he trumps up his own role in some of the campaign’s more pivotal
battles, and even makes the dubious claim that he had killed and stripped the armor from an
Indian king, an obvious attempt to associate himself with the armor-grabbing, kleos-ridden
heroes of the Homeric epics. It’s very likely that Ptolemy’s omission of Antigonus and heroic
posturing was an indirect response to his defeat at Cyprus. In addition, since Antigonus was
killed in 301 BCE at the Battle of Ipsus, and Ptolemy’s rivalry was still very much alive by the
time he began writing, it seems we can narrow down the publication date to a spread of five
years: sometime after the loss of Cyprus, and sometime before the death of Antigonus. And that
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Ptolemy, in this same period of time, also introduced coins freshly minted with Alexander’s
profile seems to support these dates.
Coins are, after all, the kind of ubiquitous, centrally-controlled memorial that move
through a culture like the popular legends Ptolemy hoped his memoir would become. Before
Alexandrian currency, coins had displayed cult symbols and city emblems, which reflected
monetary value and origin; but in Ptolemy’s hands, and for the first time in history, coins were
minted as objects of symbolic value and association. The coins can be seen as the visual
equivalent of the memoirs. Their portrayal of Alexander—which, in 305 BCE, presented him
with the horns of Ammon and an elephant’s skin from the campaigns in India—undoubtedly
supplemented the version we would’ve seen in the memoirs. Ptolemy intended both mediums to
ultimately achieve the same thing; they would make Alexander more than human, and make him
more than a satrap. With the dead king’s body in Alexandria, his image on the coins, and his
story rewritten, Ptolemy finally achieved a coherent, shared conception of Alexander—at once,
entirely under his control, and yet owned by all. In other words, he created not only images and
documents, but a entire living culture of symbols. In a sense, Ptolemy combined the
propagandistic control of Callisthenes’ official history with the mobility and ubiquity of
Cleitarchus’ soldiers’ stories, long before the “good” or “vulgate” traditions separated into
emphatically different schools of Alexandrian interpretation. As a work of history or biography,
the memoirs would have impressed few modern scholars; but, as a political maneuver, one can’t
help but admire Ptolemy’s insight—it was the same insight that Julius Caesar would have nearly
two centuries later when he chose to write his own memoir, the Bellum Gallicum.
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Ptolemy wanted to become a pharaoh; Caesar wanted to become a dictator; but this
wasn’t merely a matter of donning the pharaoh’s clothes, or sending the senate off to summary
execution. With an army, a city is taken; but with the right narrative, a city might even hand itself
over. And long before Caesar crossed the Rubicon and took control of Rome, he took control of
his story. Caesar’s account of the wars in Gaul were sent to Rome in installments over the course
of the Gallic campaigns; it was a way to speak directly to the common people without first
passing through the senate, who were doing everything they could to defuse the pro-Caesar
sentiment growing among the plebeians. It’s not hard to imagine the scene this must have created
in ancient Rome—with Caesar’s half-literate supporters reading the annual dispatches aloud to
the growing crowd of citizens—it must have evoked the ancient bards and their songs of kleos,
when citizens would gather, as if for a ritual, to celebrate the cult heroes of their polis. Caesar’s
commentary is, after all, written in third-person; and it reads less like a history than a story in
which Caesar himself is the protagonist. There’s a sentence on the Battle of the Sabis—in fact,
the longest sentence in the entire commentary—in which we see a glimpse of what Ptolemy’s
own memoirs might have been like.
Caesar drives each clause of his sentence forward like a phalanx: the fourth cohort is
wiped; a senior centurion bleeds out on the grass; the standard is captured; the bearer killed; even
salvos of arrows and javelins strike the dirt as the soldiers at the front trip over their own feet,
hesitating like scared cattle before the wailing hoards of mud-painted barbarians—and just as the
battle line starts to break, Caesar seems to take control of the field as casually as Poseidon rolls
the tide:
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Caesar saw that the rest of the men were slowing down, and some in the rear ranks had given
up fighting and were intent on getting out of range of the enemy, in front kept pouring up the
hill and were pressing down on both flanks, he recognized that this was a crisis because there
were no reserves available, so he snatched a shield from a soldier in the rear ranks - Caesar
had no shield with him - and went forward to the front line, where he called out to all the
centurions by name and shouted encouragement to the rest of the men, whom he ordered to
advance and to open out their ranks so that they could use their swords more effectively.
(Caesar, Gallic War 2.25.1.).
It begins amidst a scene of utter carnage, but his account reads as if it were given from
some point overhead. As both narrator and subject, Caesar is calm, collected and entirely in
control. He’s a father figure to his countrymen, calls them “by name.” But he’s also
otherworldly; he sees what others don’t. Caesar’s endlessly subordinating clauses would’ve left
his speaker breathless; his sentence demands participation, mandates empathy. Stylistically, it’s a
brilliant piece of propaganda. He concedes the cowardliness of the troops, admits the strength of
the Gauls, but all in order to emphasize the remarkable otherness of his own character, the
courage and strategical brilliance that sets him apart from both countrymen and hostile alike. War
is still hell, but even hell, it seems, can be endured when a man like Caesar is at the helm.
With the efficiency and matter-of-factness of a career fighter, Caesar unfolds the entire
field of action with a few quick, impressionistic strokes of his pen. And similar to the heroes of
the Homeric epics—who we see fighting as if alone among the inconsequential thousands—
Caesar places himself at the battle’s thematic center. The scene recalls Plutarch’s highly
impressionistic description of Alexander’s final battle against Darius III:
The Persians gave way before the front lines had clashed, and a fierce pursuit began, with
Alexander herding the defeated enemy into the centre where Darius was. For he had caught
sight of Darius in the distance—just a glimpse deep into the centre of the ranks of the Royal
Cavalry deployed to protect him—a tall, fine figure of a man, standing on a high chariot, and
protected by many magnificent horsemen who were drawn up in a very tight defensive
formation around his chariot . . . The bravest of them . . . were cut down in front of the king
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and fell on top of one another until they formed a barrier against the Macedonians’ charge,
entwining themselves in their death throes about the men and horses. (Waterfield. trans).
In both instances, Caesar and Alexander rise above the rank and file. Plutarch, however,
takes this even further: the whole field of battle seems to revolve around an axis between
Alexander and Darius III, reducing entire armies to the mere appendages of the two god-like
kings, as they meet for the last time, as it were, on an emptied stage. The particular brutality of
both accounts is equally telling, for it’s not only triumph that sets men apart, but also the
suffering they are willing to endure. And, in the end, the bloodied hands of Caesar and Alexander
only serve to make them more remarkable: they are fighters among fighters, staked in the same
mud as their troops and yet somehow fighting on an entirely different plain, as if their presence
were the only necessary condition for victory. In other words, if one believes the record, it seems
it was Caesar alone who defeated the Gauls. And, in some part, Ptolemy must have claimed an
equally exaggerated role in Alexander’s own campaigns. The difference, however, is that
Ptolemy appropriated a body of myth that had already existed in the common imagination for
nearly two decades. His work was the work of revision and alignment. Caesar, on the other hand,
began his memoirs on a more or less blank page. His story was his own. But what makes Caesar
so vital to understanding Ptolemy’s own memoirs is that both ultimately made a conquest of the
common imagination. It’s likely, then, that the publication of Ptolemy’s memoirs had a similar
effect in Alexandria as Caesar’s would have in Rome two centuries later. Both worked, as it
were, from the bottom up, first seizing the minds of people before the throne itself. And, like
Alexander, the myths they created eventually served others, creating and tearing down empires in
turn.
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With his memoirs, Ptolemy won the hearts and minds of the Egyptians, securing his
kingdom against Antigonus and establishing a dynasty that would rule for nearly three centuries
after his death. In a sense, the Ptolemaic dynasty is the continuation of a story which began in
Macedonia, when the pharaoh was still a childhood friend to the prince who would conquer the
world, and which would only end in part after Roman conquest and the suicide of Cleopatra in
30 BCE. It’s strangely fitting that Octavian, the adoptive son of Julius Caesar, and Cleopatra, a
direct descendant of Ptolemy—one’s political myth coming to an end, and the other just
beginning—would eventually act out the conclusion of the Ptolemaic dynasty. In less than four
centuries, the life of Alexander the Great had undergone so many transformations, had served so
many purposes, that entire kingdoms had already come and gone under the banner of his legend.
And all this, too, a century before Plutarch even heard his name or wondered who he was.
To understand Alexander’s life, it seems necessary that we also understand the lives and
ambitions of those who knew him. Their stories surround the king like leaves surround a tree,
and the cover is thick; it was already thick by the time Plutarch began the Parallel Lives almost
four hundred years after Alexander’s death. From cross-referencing later writers, it’s clear that
Plutarch used primary documents—the lost works of Ptolemy, Callisthenes and Cleitarchus—but
it’s also clear that these documents were less authorities on Alexander as he was than authorities
on what Alexander could become. And if we see these writers as mere propagandists, we miss
the point; even if Ptolemy helped make Alexander a god, and even if Callisthenes made him
seem like more than a man, it’s hard to believe that either of these representations failed to
portray something of Alexander’s actual life. The record is exaggerated, but it seems this was
inevitable. Alexander was, himself, an extraordinary person; he demanded extraordinary myth,
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extraordinary explanation. His impact was too huge and too sudden to become a mere chapter in
the histories; the “good” and “vulgate” traditions represent not only the different ways in which
writers have answered the question of who Alexander was, they also suggest something true
about past writing in general.
If we believe, as the Italian philosopher Benedetto Croce has claimed, that “all history is
contemporary history,” then the pursuit of chronicling the past is less a science than a form of art
or poetry. There are, in other words, no right answers. And each generation of historians takes up
the endeavor of interpretation, extracting their own causes and patterns from the ever-growing
mass of history. But Croce’s claim is less weary or cynical than it might seem. He’s not saying
that the past is irretrievable or that our historians are merely the writers of fiction, but that each
generation takes up the threads like Penelope at her loom, and does the work of history, over and
over again. When it’s not an act of cooperation—as it is with Arrian, who perpetuates the
Ptolemaic account—it’s an act of revision. But ultimately the histories we write reflect the past
just as much as they reflect the moment in which we write them. We see this in Ptolemy,
Callisthenes, Cleitarchus—over and over again, the same story told anew. Perhaps, then, we can
complicate Aristotle’s claim that “poetry utters universal truths” while history utters “particular
statements” (Poetics). The stuff of history may very well be facts, deeds, or simply “things
done,” but this doesn’t keep the historian or the biographer from taking up these threads in order
to find new meaning in old material; it even seems necessary. Aristotle believes history to be
dead, that to produce a particular, unchanging statement about it is work enough. In other words,
history is an artifact, and can only mean one thing. But who would say that a statement—even if
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it’s about a thing already done, a life already lived—doesn’t take on new meaning for new people
and new eras?
On July 1st, 1798, as the ancient fortifications of Alexandria breached the horizon and the
sunlight leapt atop the tide, General Napoleon Bonaparte took the quarter deck of his ship with
might have been a feeling reverence for the city’s founder, a conquerer like himself: Alexander
the Great. When the general turned to address the company of officers and captains, and the
defenders of Alexandria took their positions along the city’s high walls, Napoleon gave a speech
that might still surprise us:
The peoples we will be living alongside are Muslims; their first article of faith is "There is no
other god but God, and Mahomet is his prophet". Do not contradict them; treat them as you
treated the Jews, the Italians; respect their muftis and their imams, as you respected their
rabbis and bishops. Have the same tolerance for the ceremonies prescribed by the Quran, for
their mosques, as you had for the convents, for the synagogues, for the religion of Moses and
that of Jesus Christ . . . You will here find different customs to those of Europe, you must get
accustomed to them.
Although separated by more than two millennia, Napoleon Bonaparte knew Alexander
well; and it was Plutarch, the Roman author of the Parallel Lives, who introduced them.
Napoleon placed Plutarch above all other writers and historians; and he read his work
voraciously, taking a predictable interest in the dual Lives of Alexander the Great and Julius
Caesar. In fact, Napoleon was so steeped in Roman and Greek history that the Corsican rebel
leader, Pasquale Paoli, once remarked to him, “There is nothing modern in you; you are entirely
out of Plutarch.”
It’s not a coincidence then that Napoleon, upon arriving en force on the shores of
Alexander’s own city, would offer a speech—a whole social program even—which so clearly
borrows from the ancient king’s own policies of cultural fusion as outlined in Plutarch’s work. It
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was in Parthia that Alexander adopted “non-Greek clothing” for the first time and allowed his
conquered subjects to lay prostrate before him as they did before Darius III, the defeated godking of the Achaemenid empire. This inspired outrage and confusion among the Macedonians
and Greeks who were unable to see Eastern customs as anything but backwards and barbaric. But
the warriors’ protests did little to change Alexander’s mind, and the loudest among them were
routinely rounded up for summary execution—a punitive policy that towards the end of
Alexander’s life became more and more common.
In Plutarch’s own words, Alexander’s policy of cultural fusion was based, very simply,
“on the grounds that the sight of what is familiar and congenial goes a long way towards winning
people over” (354). In other words, being not only a brilliant military commander but also a
perceptive governor, Alexander made public relations one of the top priorities of his empire. In
the city of Susa, Alexander even went so far as to conduct a mass wedding ceremony between
Persian noblewomen and Macedonian officers with the goal, as Diodorus relates, of “bringing
the two major continents, by way of intermarriages and family bonds, into a common harmony
and a brotherly affection” (Library). Alexander’s vision of a single-state spanning Europe and
Asia, united by a program of “brotherly affection” and harmony was, and still is, a plan of
singular ambition. And there is no doubt that Napoleon thought of this and the great king as his
fleet lay siege to Alexandria.
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